Iraq and Postwar Germany

Quite often apologists for the Iraq War point to American success in postwar Germany as a rationale for the the military occupation of Iraq.  Both Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice often draw parallels to postwar Germany as a reason to stay the course: Democracy  will eventually blossom in Iraq the same way it did in Germany thanks to the American occupation.  And recently Republican presidential candidate John McCain has held out the possibility of America "staying in Iraq for one hundred years" the same way we have had a military presence in Germany for more than half a century.

Now historian David Stafford continues this argument in a piece in the Washington Post: Iraq is a Mess. But Germany Was, Too. Stafford’s reasoning, however, it muddled.  He does point out the significant differences between post-invasion Iraq and defeated Germany:

It would be harder to think of two more different societies than
Germany in 1945 and contemporary Iraq. The former — despite Hitler and
the Third Reich — had a long tradition of law, order, constitutional
government and civic society to draw on in rebuilding democracy. Nor
was it riven by deep-rooted ethnic and sectarian religious tensions
that erupted to the surface once the dictator’s iron fist was removed.
And although Germany certainly had hostile neighbors — especially to
the communist East — the threat they posed served to create, not
crack, political cohesion.

But then he draws parallels between the de-Baathification efforts in Iraq and the American attempt to purge Nazi’s from positions of power in Germany.

Critics of the Bush administration’s handling of Iraq point to the
decisions by L. Paul Bremer, Garner’s replacement, to dismiss Baathists
from public office and to dissolve the Iraqi army as critical and
disastrous turning points that created a vast legion of the unemployed
and disaffected. Yet in 1945, the Allies implemented a similarly
draconian policy in Germany. They dissolved the Nazi Party, carried out
a thorough purge of Nazis in public office and even abolished the
ancient state of Prussia, which they believed was at the root of German
militarism. Millions of Wehrmacht soldiers languished in
prisoner-of-war camps while their families struggled to survive.

But the American occupation forces in Germany were far more pragmatic than the neocon ideologues in charge of Iraq: they quickly changed course and brought former Nazis into the governance structure and economic reconstruction programs.

Ultimately, Stafford concludes, the American occupation of Germany was pretty much a failure several years in, and it was only the economic assistance of the Marshall Plan that finally changed the game and brought some stability:

Even so, despite this willingness to rethink and adjust, occupation
policy floundered. Two years after Allied victory, Germany was in
desperate straits, facing an economic crisis that threatened to nip
democracy in the bud. Only the Marshall Plan, with its massive program
of financial aid, saved the country from disaster. Self-government did
not come until 1949, and Allied troops remained in West Germany as
occupiers until 1955, a full decade after the defeat of the Third Reich.

So, Stafford seems to think, a Marshall Plan for Iraq and a long-term military occupation might  bring stability to the ruined country.  Trouble is, the success of the Marshall Plan has never been duplicated.  President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress – a Marshall Plan for Latin America – was a bust. And the attempts in the 1980s to establish a Marshall Plan for the Third World failed miserably. 

Two key elements are missing in Iraq for a successful Marshall Plan effort.  The first is security.  Tony Judt points out in his great work of history Postwar that the Korean War was an enormous benefit to Europe, since the US invested significant security resources there to prevent a "second front" from opening in the west.  The other missing factor is ownership.  By 1949 Europe had functioning governments everywhere – including Germany – and took complete ownership of the Marshall Plan.  Iraq, on the other hand, has a corrupt, dysfunctional government which lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most Iraqi citizens.  Also, the Bush Administration has awarded reconstruction projects to American firms, often under no-bid contracts as a way of rewarding political allies.  I fear reconstruction in Iraq can never succeed as long as the country is occupied by American troops. I wish I could see the success of postwar Germany as a reason to celebrate a hundred-year occupation for Iraq, but I can’t.  There are no parallels and Stafford is sadly mistaken.