Angela Merkel has successfully consolidated her power with the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), and her party has extended its lead to double digits over the the SPD in polls nearly three months before the early national election. Should the CDU win an absolute majority in September, then Merkel will give the post of foreign secretary to CSU leader Edmund Stoiber. In the event of a Black-Gold coaltion government the post would go to Wolfgang Gerhard. But if there is any weakness in Angela Merkel’s leadership abilities it is in the area of foreign policy. Today’s taz has an interesting article discussing this weakness and how the SPD hopes to exploit this during the election campaign this summer:
Schon beim G-8-Treffen im Juli und beim EU-Krisengipfel
Mitte dieses Monats bietet sich Schröder die ganz große außenpolitische
Bühne. Die Wochen dazwischen wird er nutzen, um einmal mehr an das
gründlich missglückte außenpolitische Debüt Angela Merkels zu erinnern.
Schon bevor die Kanzlerkandidatin offiziell nominiert war, warf
Schröder der CDU-Chefin vergangene Woche vor, dass sie sich vor dem
Irakkrieg vor der Verantwortung "gedrückt" habe. "Das kann wieder
passieren", so Schröder. "Und das wird man den Menschen auch sagen."Die Botschaft: Wer wie Merkel in einer historischen Krise
so versagt hat, der gehört nicht ins Kanzleramt. Angela Merkel war Ende
Februar 2003 – die Irakinvasion war im Stillen schon angelaufen – nach
Washington geeilt, um sich bei Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld und
Condoleezza Rice von der kritischen Haltung der Bundesregierung zu
distanzieren. Nach Kriegsbeginn hatte Merkel, trotz vieler kritischer
Stimmen aus der eigenen Partei, ihre Unterstützung für Bushs
Irakinvasion noch einmal bekräftigt.
Merkel’s support for the Iraq invasion even upset members of her own party. But much of the anger over the Iraq war has subsided , and, unless the US undertakes unilateral military action against Iran or Syria in the next couple of months, it is unlikely that Schröder can rely on anti-American sentiment to secure an election victory this time. But other than a vague commitment to stand by the United States, what are Merkel’s other foreign policy objectives? The other key piece to her platform is a rejection of Turkey’s entry into the EU – a policy that puts her at odds with Washington. Otherwise there is a singular lack of global vision in Merkel’s foreign policy statements up to now. That is unlikely to hurt her chances in the election, as Katherin Schmidt writes in the this week’s Freitag:
Jetzt also Hoch-Zeit für die Schwarzen. Außenpolitisch scheint derzeit
eine gewisse Beruhigung eingezogen, so dass nicht einmal mehr der
CDU/CSU und Angela Merkels Haltung zum Irak-Krieg eine Rolle spielt,
ja, nicht erinnerlich ist.
0 comment
David
I agree that Merkel is most probably lacking in foriegn policy experience. But, like Tip O’Neil said many years ago “all politics are local.” Don’t you agree that it will be her domestic plans (and more importantly the marketing of her plans to the electorate)that will cause her and her coalition to sink or swim?
If, after Merkel takes office, Germany posts decent economic numbers (2.6-3.0% GDP growth) Merkel will get away with pretty much anything.
But that is a big if.
Angela Merkel is not an economist.
The economic ideas of the CDU and FDP fit perfectly with the mainstream description of “Germany’s problems” (lack of flexibility, overdone welfare, high wages).
But there are quite a number of prominent macro-economists who say that these no longer are a problem in Germany. The real problem is lack of domestic demand and this needs support. Indeed more liberalizing reforms along the mainstream lines might make things worse.
If they are right, the CDU will start losing votes quickly after the election.
khr –
Could you point me to these macro-economists who want to address the domestic demand issue?
Thanks,
David
FT – Germany sometimes argues like the SPD left wing: Give the poor more money to stimulate the domestic demand. But in most cases they don’t explain what this mean:
– surplus on even high wages of lower income class
– increased welfare benefits
… this is all contradictory to streamlining the welfare state
David
I had answered a similar question on Brad Plumer’s weblog:
http://plumer.blogspot.com/2005_06_01_plumer_archive.html#111774072653904277
Below, I have copied my answer:
Unfortunately, I am not aware of any texts in English that cover the whole story of the German economic dissidents.
The two books I have read are:
Peter Bofinger ‘Wir sind besser als wir denken’ (We are better than we think)
http://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos…how=- submittime
Albrecht Müller ‘Die Reformlüge’ (The reform lie)
http://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos…4672839- 3890161
I have seen, but not read several others.
A German investor’s magazine ‘Euro’ had an article in a similar vein advicing its readers to invest at home.
Peter Bofinger is a macroeconomics professor and member of the ‘Sachverständigenrat’ Council of Economics advisers to the German Government. He has a German-language homepage:
http://www.single-generation.de/ …er_bofinger.htm
Bofinger has several English-language economics texts (see Amazon), but none, I think that covers these issues.
Albrecht Müller worked in economics functions for the governments of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. His (German) Weblog/homepage is here:
http://www.nachdenkseiten.de/
Using a web translator, you might be able to make sense of them.
The issue of restrictive monetary policies are common knowledge and have been variously discussed in OECD and IWF papers and the business press (e.g.the Economist)
The good position of Germany vis a vis foreign competition can be easily gleaned from the relevant statistics, e.g. from the Bundesbank:
http://www.bundesbank.de/ statist…nwirtschaft.php
These are in German, but you should be able to find the numbers on most business / financial websites
German unification has variously been discussed, but I don’t know of a good English overview.
Thanks for the reference to Bofinger. I’m already quite familiar with Albrecht Mueller (see my Reading List) and I enjoy his highly critical postings on NachDenkSeiten. What bothers me, though, is that he seems to see the 1970s as a “Golden Age” in Germany – coincidentally the same time period he was serving Chancellor Schmidt. I’m not sure that the 1970s can be a model for anything – especially not in this era of inexorable globalization.
I prefer Bofinger’s book, mainly because it is better organized than Müller. Müller is somewhat repetitive and occasionally a bit confusing.
Both have basically the same views about the German economy.
They have the same pet enemies – Hans-Werner Sinn and the bunch of people producing hot air at Sabine Christiansen’s talkshow 😉
Bofinger also thinks that the 70s were better times, mainly because economic policy was better then. Times were not too easy then, with oil-price shocks and growing international competition. Bofinger was a university student at the time.
Bofinger and Müller also have basically the same ideas about the neccessary macroeconomic policies.
They agree that the welfare state should not be reduced, though differ in the details of what ought to be done about specific issues.
I agree with Müller that ‘Globalization’ is just a new word for an old phenomenon. World trade dates from the times of Christopher Columbus. Steam ships and the telegraph accelerated transport and communications in the 19th century. In the late sixties, discussions about multinational companies were all the rage.
In the 1970’s foreign competition decimated the German consumer electronics and photo industries etc. According to both Müller and Bofinger, the German economy coped better at the time, because good policies allowed dynamic growth to absorb any jobless workers.